UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

11-3-2017

Joy v. State Appellant's Brief 2 Dckt. 45044

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported

Recommended Citation
"Joy v. State Appellant's Brief 2 Dckt. 45044" (2017). Not Reported. 4273.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/4273

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

PRESTON ADAM JOY,
No. 45044
Petitioner‐Appellant,
Kootenai County Case No.
CV‐2016‐0003717

v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

_______________________
CORRECTED BRIEF OF APPELLANT
_______________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
_______________________
HONORABLE JOHN T. MITCHELL, PRESIDING
_______________________

CRAIG H. DURHAM
Ferguson Durham, PLLC
223 N. 6th Street, Suite 325
Boise, Idaho, 83702
(208)‐345‐5183 ext. 1000
chd@fergusondurham.com
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ iv
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..................................................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ................................................................................................................... 1
Statement of Facts and Course of the Proceedings ............................................................. 1
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL........................................................................................... 7
ARGUMENT................................................................................................................................. 8
I: The district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Joy’s motion for
disqualification in the post‐conviction proceeding. ............................................................ 8
1.

Introduction ................................................................................................................ 8

2.

Standard of Review.................................................................................................... 8

3.

Legal Standards Governing Judicial Disqualification .......................................... 9

4.

Discussion ................................................................................................................. 10

II: Given that Mr. Joy filed his petition within one year after a “proceeding
following an appeal” became final, the district court erred as a matter of law in
concluding that claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel related to the first
trial were time‐barred under Idaho Code § 19‐4902(a). ..................................................... 13
1.

Introduction .............................................................................................................. 13
ii

2.

Standard of Review.................................................................................................. 13

3.

Discussion ................................................................................................................. 13

III: The district court erred in summarily dismissing Count VI in Mr. Joy’s amended
petition because he had alleged facts that, if true, established ineffective assistance of
counsel based on counsel’s failure, immediately after the first appeal, to file a motion
for the automatic disqualification of the presiding judge. ............................................... 15
1.

Introduction .............................................................................................................. 15

2.

Standard of Review.................................................................................................. 15

3.

Legal standards Governing Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel ....... 16

4.

Discussion ................................................................................................................. 17

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................... 22

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 149 Idaho 107, 233 P.3d 35 (2009) ................................ 8, 9
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) .............................................................. 9
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 102 P.3d 1108 (2004) ...................................................... 16
Commonwealth v. Mallory, 941 A.2d 686 (Penn. 2008) ............................................................ 21
Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006) ............................................................... 20
Freeman v. State, 122 Idaho 627, 836 P.2d 1088 (Ct. App. 1992) ........................................... 14
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). .............................................................................. 16
Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388, 111 P.3d 73 (2005) ............................ 13
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) ...................................................................................... 20, 21
In re Murchison, 349 U. S. 133, 135 (1955). ................................................................................. 9
Johnson v. State, 156 Idaho 7, 319 P.3d 491 (2014)................................................................... 16
Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 236 P.3d 1277 (2010). ................................................................ 16
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994)........................................................................... 9, 10
Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301 (2000) ......................................................... 9, 10
Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 321 P.3d 709 (2014)............................................................... 16
Peregrina v. State, 158 Idaho 948, 354 P.3d 510 (2015). ........................................................... 14
Perry v. Magic Valley Regʹl Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 995 P.2d 816 (2000)............................... 8
Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 227 P.3d 925 (2010) ............................................................... 16
iv

State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 313 P.3d 1 (2013) ................................................................... 17
State v. Keller, 760 N.W.2d 451 (Iowa 2009) ............................................................................ 21
State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 199 P.3d 123 (2008) ........................................................... 15, 18
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) .................................................................... 16, 17
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U. S. 35 (1975)......................................................................................... 9

Statutes
Idaho Code § 19‐4902(a) ...................................................................................................7, 13, 14

Rules
I.R.C.P 40(b)(2) ...............................................................................................................................9
I.R.C.P 40(b)(1)(D) .........................................................................................................................9
I.C.R. 25 .............................................................................................................................15, 17, 18
I.C.R 25(a)(5) ...............................................................................................................................18

v

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Preston Adam Joy appeals from the district court’s judgment summarily
dismissing his amended petition for post‐conviction relief.
Statement of Facts and Course of the Proceedings
In 2009, the State charged Mr. Joy with second degree kidnapping, felony
domestic battery, and forcible penetration by a foreign object. State v. Joy, Docket No.
42166, Opinion No. 707 at *1 (Ct. App. 2015), (Clerk’s R., p. 38.) These charges were
based on a domestic incident between Mr. Joy and his wife at the time, Jennifer. (Id.)
The case went to a jury trial. The jury found Mr. Joy guilty of domestic battery,
but it acquitted him of forcible penetration and it could not agree on the kidnapping
charge. (Clerk’s R., p. 38.) Before a new trial on the kidnapping charge, he entered a
conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the courtʹs pretrial, trial, and post‐
trial rulings. (Id.)
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court vacated Mr. Joyʹs judgment of conviction
and remanded the case for a new trial. State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 304 P .3d 276 (2013). In
doing so, it found that the presiding district judge, Hon. John T. Mitchell, had abused
his discretion in multiple ways. Though the Supreme Court found reversible error
based on Judge Mitchell’s decision to admit prior bad acts evidence, it also opined on
the lower court’s many other errors, including the refusal to give a lesser included
1

offense; quashing a subpoena duces tecum for relevant evidence on Jennifer’s
computer; erroneously admitting Jennifer’s preliminary hearing testimony; improperly
admitting Jennifer’s statements to a detective; admitting a boot lace; and overruling the
prosecutor’s improper cross‐examination questions. Joy, 155 Idaho at 3‐16, 304 P.3d at
279‐92.
Mr. Joy alleges that after the Supreme Court issued its opinion, but before the
remittitur came down, he anticipated that the case would return to the district court for
a new trial. (Clerk’s R., p. 21; Petitioner’s Verified Amended Petition for Post‐
Conviction Relief.) He wanted to disqualify Judge Mitchell, and he spoke to his
appellate counsel about the process under Idaho Criminal Rule 25 to disqualify the
court from presiding over any new trial. (Id.)
Based on that conversation, Mr. Joy called his appointed counsel in the district
court, Sean Walsh, and requested that he file a timely motion to recuse under Rule 25.
(Id.) Indeed, he called Walsh “many times before and at least once after the remittitur
was filed …” (Id.) Mr. Walsh agreed to file the motion to disqualify the judge, but then
later told Mr. Joy that he was “too f‐‐‐‐ busy.” (Id.)
Nearly a year after the reversal on appeal, however, Mr. Walsh did file a
“Request for Self‐Recusal or in the Alternative Motion to Recuse for Cause.” (Clerk’s
Record, Exhibit 1.) Judge Mitchell denied that request, in part on timeliness grounds
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(Clerk’s R. p. 21), and the case proceeded to a second trial on domestic battery and
second‐degree kidnapping.
This time, Mr. Joy was acquitted of the kidnapping charge but convicted of
domestic battery. (Clerk’s R., p. 19.) Judge Mitchell sentenced him to the maximum
term allowed by law, ten years, with nine of those years determinate. (Clerk’s R., p. 16.)
The Idaho Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed the judgment in an unpublished
opinion released on November 13, 2015. (Clerk’s R., p. 16.)
Mr. Joy next filed a post‐conviction petition on May 16, 2016, raising claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel at his first trial, his second trial, and his second appeal,
and a claim that he had been deprived of a fair and impartial judge. (Clerk’s R., pp. 1‐
11.)
The court appointed counsel, who then filed an amended petition containing
seven claims for relief, as follows:
Count I: Ineffective assistance of counsel at the first trial for waiving Mr.
Joy’s right to a speedy trial against his expressed instructions;
Count II: Ineffective assistance at the first trial for failing to challenge the
sufficiency of the State’s Information;
Count III: Ineffective assistance at the first trial for not subpoenaing
witnesses and for not being prepared for trial;
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Count IV: Ineffective assistance of counsel at the first trial because counsel
did not disclose their relationship or their marriage, which affected their
duties of loyalty to Mr. Joy;
Count V: Ineffective assistance of substituted counsel Sean Walsh on
remand from the Idaho Supreme Court for failing assert Mr. Joy’s right to
a speedy trial and instead waiving that right;
Count VI: Ineffective assistance of Mr. Walsh on remand from the Idaho
Supreme Court for failing to file a motion to disqualify the presiding judge
immediately after the Idaho Supreme Court issued the remittitur vacating
the judgment;
Count VII: Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel during the second
appeal for conceding issues regarding a defective information; and
Count VIII: A claim that Mr. Joy was deprived of a fair and impartial judge
because the judge exhibited bias against him throughout the proceedings.
(Clerk’s R., pp. 15‐26.)
Mr. Joy’s post‐conviction counsel also took another run at disqualifying Judge
Mitchell from hearing the post‐conviction matter by filing a motion for disqualification.
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(Clerk’s R., pp. 27‐28.) After argument, Judge Mitchell denied the motion.1 (Id. at 43; ln.
22‐5.)
Judge Mitchell later granted the State’s motion for summary dismissal of all
claims in the amended petition. (Tr. Feb. 2, 2017 Hearing, p. 18; ln. 13‐25; p. 19, ln. 1‐25;
p. 20, ln. 1‐13.)
He first concluded that Counts I through IV, raising issues regarding counsel’s
performance at the first trial, including a claim that counsel did not preserve Mr. Joy’s
speedy trial rights, were time‐barred because a petition as not filed within one‐year of
the conclusion of the first appeal. (Tr., p. 18, ln. 13‐25; p. 19, ln. 1‐8.)
Next, addressing Count V – in which Mr. Joy alleged that Attorney Walsh was
ineffective in failing to assert Mr. Joy’s right to a speedy trial at the second trial – the
district court dismissed it because Mr. Joy “had his second trial.” (Tr., p. 19, ln. 9‐19.)
The court then joined Count VI – in which Mr. Joy contended that Mr. Walsh’s
failure to file an automatic disqualification motion under I.C.R. 25 after reversal of the
conviction was ineffective assistance of counsel – with Count VIII – in which Mr. Joy

Mr. Joy’s counsel also filed a motion to disqualify the Kootenai County
Prosecuting Attorney’s Office because one of Mr. Joy’s trial attorneys, who was the
subject of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, had started working as a
prosecutor. (Clerk’s R., pp. 51‐53.) The District Court denied that motion, insofar as it
related to resolving the motion for summary dismissal, because the attorney’s testimony
was not needed at that stage in the proceeding. (Tr. Feb. 2, 2017 Hearing, p. 16; ln. 6‐18.)
Mr. Joy does not appeal that determination but reserves the right to re‐assert the
issue should the case be remanded and proceed to an evidentiary hearing.
5
1

reasserted that he was deprived of a fair and impartial judge. (Tr., p. 19, ln. 20‐21; p. 20,
ln. 1‐2.) Eliding the distinction in those different claims (ineffective assistance versus
judicial bias), Judge Mitchell dismissed them after concluding that he had “already
dealt with that [the issue of his bias or prejudice]” and because there was no “factual or
legal basis in Counts 6 and 8 of the petition.” (Tr., p. 19, ln. 20‐24.)
Finally, Judge Mitchell dismissed Mr. Joy’s allegation that his appellate counsel
was ineffective in conceding an arguable issue on the second appeal related to a
defective charging document (Count VII). (Tr., p. 20, ln. 3‐8.)
Judgment was entered on June 8, 2017. (Id. at 71.)
Mr. Joy now appeals.
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I.
The district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Joy’s motion for disqualification
in the post‐conviction proceeding.

II.
Given that Mr. Joy filed his petition within one year after a “proceeding following an
appeal” became final, the district court erred as a matter of law in concluding that claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel related to the first trial were time‐barred under Idaho
Code § 19‐4902(a).

III.
The district court erred in summarily dismissing Count VI in Mr. Joy’s amended petition
because he alleged facts that, if true, established ineffective assistance of counsel based
on counsel’s failure, immediately after the first appeal, to file a motion for the automatic
disqualification of the presiding judge.

7

ARGUMENT
I.
The district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Joy’s motion for disqualification
in the post‐conviction proceeding.
1.

Introduction

Judge Mitchell presided over the first two trials and the post‐conviction matter.
By then, Mr. Joy had presented a wealth of evidence to show at least the strong
appearance of bias or prejudice. Judge Mitchell should have granted Mr. Joy’s motion to
disqualify, and this Court should remand for reconsideration of the post‐conviction
petition by a different judge.
2.

Standard of Review

Whether it is necessary for a judicial officer to disqualify himself or herself in a
given case is left to the sound discretion of the judicial officer. Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial
Council, 149 Idaho 107, 113, 233 P.3d 35, 44 (2009).
“To determine whether a trial court has abused its discretion, this Court
considers whether it correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, whether it acted
within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards,
and whether it reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” Perry v. Magic Valley Regʹl
Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 51, 995 P.2d 816, 821 (2000).
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3.

Legal Standards Governing Judicial Disqualification

A fair hearing in front of a fair and impartial tribunal is a basic component of due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment. In re Murchison, 349 U. S. 133, 135 (1955). A
due process violation occurs when “the probability of actual bias on the part of the
judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U. S. 35, 47 (1975)).
Moreover, under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 40(b)(1)(D), a party may file a
motion for disqualification of a judge for bias or prejudice at any time. The motion
“must be accompanied by an affidavit of the party or the partyʹs attorney stating the
specific grounds upon which disqualification is based and the facts relied upon in
support of the motion.” I.R.C.P 40(b)(2).
In Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, the Idaho Supreme Court provided some
guidance in applying these standards. There, it cited favorably to Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s statement in Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301 (2000), regarding
when a judge should recuse himself or herself. Bradbury, 149 Idaho 107, 113, 233 P.3d 35,
44. The Idaho Supreme Court found the statement instructive because of the similarities
between recusal requirements under state and federal law. Specifically, it quoted Chief
Justice Rehnquist:
As this Court has stated, what matters under § 455(a) “is not the reality of
bias or prejudice but its appearance.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540,
9

548, 114 S.Ct. 1147 [1154] 127 L.Ed.2d 474 [486] (1994). This inquiry is an
objective one, made from the perspective of a reasonable observer who is
informed of all the surrounding facts and circumstances.
Bradbury, 149 Idaho 107, 113‐14, 233 P.3d 35, 44 (2009) (citing Microsoft Corp. v.
United States, 530 U.S. at 1302.)
4.

Discussion

Mr. Joy’s case had a long and circuitous path to the post‐conviction proceeding,
and he had alleged sufficient facts in support of his motion for disqualification that a
reasonable observer would question Judge Mitchell’s continued impartiality.
After the first trial, Judge Mitchell sentenced Mr. Joy to the maximum sentence
allowed for domestic battery, ten years fixed. Idaho Code § 18‐918(b). According to Mr.
Joy’s allegations in his amended petition, when he filed a Rule 35 motion to reduce his
sentence after the first trial, the judge responded that he was “slack jawed” and that it
was “mind boggling” that Mr. Joy would seek a reduction in sentence. (Tr., Jan. 9, 2017
Hearing, p.29, ln. 18‐19.)
Nevertheless, on appeal the Idaho Supreme Court vacated the judgment and
remanded after finding that the presiding judge had abused his discretion in several
respects. He had let in wholesale prior bad acts evidence. He failed to instruct the jury
to consider lesser included offenses. He allowed the prosecutor free reign, improperly,
when cross‐examining Mr. Joy. He allowed Jennifer Joy’s statement to a detective to
10

come into evidence when it shouldn’t have. He quashed a subpoena for relevant
evidence. He allowed Jennifer’s preliminary hearing testimony to be admitted
erroneously. He allowed an exhibit to be admitted that lacked proper authentication.
State v. Joy, 155 Idaho at 3‐16, 304 P.3d at 279‐92.
But it was more than just a pattern of unfavorable and erroneous rulings against
Mr. Joy. According to his amended petition, on remand and before the second trial
Judge Mitchell questioned the wisdom of the State’s withdrawal of an Information Part
II seeking a sentencing enhancement, which it brought forward for the first time after
the successful appeal. (Clerk’s R., p. 23.) The State withdrew the charge after defense
counsel objected that its inclusion would be purely vindictive for winning on appeal.
According to Mr. Joy, the judge nonetheless said that if it had not been withdrawn, he
would have allowed it. (Id.) Also according to Mr. Joy’s allegations, the judge continued
the second trial after disregarding Mr. Joy’s written assertion of his speedy trial rights.
(Id.) He again sentenced Mr. Joy to the maximum term, but this time with nine years
fixed instead of ten.
The facts in this record therefore include, among other things, a pattern and
record of one‐sided rulings and errors at the first trial; a maximum sentence; comments
on the record expressing incredulity when the sentence was challenged; a chastising
reversal on direct appeal; comments urging the filing of an Information Part II even
when the State withdrew it; a failure to observe the defendant’s desire to retain his
11

speedy trial rights; and a previous motion seeking disqualification for bias. Mr. Joy
respectfully submits these facts developed over the course of several years would lead
an objective observer to question the judge’s continued impartiality. This Court should
likewise so find and conclude that the district court erred in denying the motion.
In reaching that conclusion, this Court should turn aside any argument from the
State that Mr. Joy did not strictly comply with Rule 40(b)(2) based on a supposed failure
to file an affidavit in support. Judge Mitchell noted this purported deficiency, but Mr.
Joy’s counsel did provide an affidavit, which was the same affidavit that was filed in
the previous motion to disqualify in the criminal matter. (See Exhibit 1, Jan. 9, 2017
Hearing.) He also incorporated the allegations in Mr. Joy’s verified petition, which
serves as sworn testimony. (Clerk’s R., pp. 22‐23, 27.) And he asked the district court to
allow Mr. Joy to testify on the motion at the hearing, but that request was refused. (Tr.,
Jan. 9, 2017 Hearing, p. 18, ln. 24‐25; p. 19, ln 1‐5.) It is difficult to understand why live
testimony, subject to cross‐examination, could not serve as an adequate or perhaps
superior substitute for written testimony.
For all of these reasons, the district court erred in refusing to step aside. This
Court should remand for a new post‐conviction proceeding in front of a different judge.
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II.
Given that Mr. Joy filed his petition within one year after a “proceeding following an
appeal” became final, the district court erred as a matter of law in concluding that
claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel related to the first trial were time‐barred
under Idaho Code § 19‐4902(a).
1.

Introduction

Idaho Code § 19‐4902(a) extends the time to file a post‐conviction to one year
after a “proceeding following an appeal.” Here, the Idaho Supreme Court vacated the
judgment on direct appeal and remanded for further proceedings in 2013. Those
proceedings were not final until the conclusion of the second appeal in late 2015. Mr.
Joy filed his post‐conviction petition in May of 2016, within one year after that appeal
was final, and his claims related to the first trial were therefore timely.
2.

Standard of Review

The determination of the applicable statute of limitation is a question of law over
which this Court has free review. Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388,
403, 111 P.3d 73, 88 (2005).
3.

Discussion

Counts I to IV in the amended petition raised claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel at Mr. Joy’s first trial. The district court granted the State’s motion for summary

13

dismissal as to those counts after concluding that the petition “is not timely relative to
anything involved in the first trial.” (Tr., Feb. 2, 2017 Hearing, p. 18, ln. 15.)
The district court was apparently persuaded by the State’s argument that
because the remittitur in the first appeal came down on July 26, 2013, the one‐year
statute of limitations in Idaho Code § 19‐4902(a) started to run and expired on July 26,
2014. (Clerk’s R., pp. 49‐50.) According to that theory, the May 16, 2016 petition, to the
extent that it raised claims related to the first trial, was nearly two years out of time. (Id.)
This argument is legally incorrect. The relevant portion of the statute reads, “[a]n
application may be filed at any time within one (1) year from the expiration of the time
for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the determination of a proceeding
following an appeal, whichever is later.” Idaho Code § 19‐4902(a) (emphasis added). A
“proceeding following an appeal” includes “a remand of the criminal case to the trial
court as a consequence of the direct appeal from a judgment of conviction” Freeman v.
State, 122 Idaho 627, 629, 836 P.2d 1088, 1090 (Ct. App. 1992). Contrary to the State and
the court’s interpretation, the timeliness of a post‐conviction action is determined by the
date when the judgment of conviction becomes final. Peregrina v. State, 158 Idaho 948,
951, 354 P.3d 510, 513 (2015).
In this case, the district court’s judgment was vacated by the Supreme Court’s
order in the first appeal and did not become final until the second appeal concluded in
late 2015. (Clerk’s R., p. 16.) The district court erred in finding that the statute of
14

limitations had expired as to Counts I to IV when the petition was filed within a year of
finality, in May of 2016. This Court should therefore remand for consideration on the
merits of those four claims.
III.
The district court erred in summarily dismissing Count VI in Mr. Joy’s amended
petition because he alleged facts that, if true, established ineffective assistance of
counsel based on counsel’s failure, immediately after the first appeal, to file a motion
for the automatic disqualification of the presiding judge.
1.

Introduction

In Count VI of the amended petition, Mr. Joy alleged that his appointed counsel
was constitutionally ineffective in failing to file a motion to disqualify Judge Mitchell,
pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 25, after the Idaho Supreme Court issued its remittitur
in the first appeal. At that time, Mr. Joy had a renewed right to disqualify the presiding
judge without showing any cause. Had the motion been filed, Judge Mitchell would
have had no choice but to grant it and assign a different presiding judge.
2.

Standard of Review

When considering whether to dismiss a petition summarily, the district court
must construe disputed facts in the petitioner’s favor, though the court is not required
to accept mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or
conclusions of law. State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008). If the
15

petition, affidavits, and other evidence supporting the petition allege facts that, if true,
would entitle the petitioner to relief, a post‐conviction claim may not be summarily
dismissed. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004). If a
genuine issue of material fact is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted.
Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 521, 236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010).
This Court applies the same standards used by the lower courts and examines
whether the petitionerʹs admissible evidence asserts facts which, if true, would entitle
the petitioner to relief. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925, 929 (2010).
3.

Legal Standards Governing Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Mr. Joy was entitled to the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). He also had a
concomitant right under Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution. Murray v. State, 156
Idaho 159, 164, 321 P.3d 709, 714 (2014).
The test for determining whether the defendant has been deprived of that
constitutional right is two‐fold: first, he must show that his counsel committed errors
that fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and, second, he must
demonstrate that he suffered actual prejudice as a result of those errors. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685‐86 (1984); accord Johnson v. State, 156 Idaho 7, 10–11, 319
P.3d 491, 494–95 (2014). Prejudice in this context means that, but for counsel’s errors,
16

there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different. Strickland,
466 U.S at 694. A reasonable probability is one that is “sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” Id.
When a petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel based on counselʹs
failure to file a motion, a ʺcritical inquiry is whether the motion, if filed, should have
been granted ...ʺ State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 385, 313 P.3d 1, 41 (2013).
4.

Discussion

In Count VI of his amended petition, Mr. Joy alleged that his appointed counsel
failed to file a timely Idaho Criminal Rule 25 motion for disqualification despite his
repeated requests that counsel do so. (Clerk’s R., pp. 20‐21.) Specifically, he claimed that
after the Idaho Supreme Court released its opinion in the first appeal, but before it
issued the remittitur, he anticipated that the case would return to the district court.
(Clerk’s R., pp. 20‐21.) He talked to his appellate counsel about how he could
accomplish disqualification of Judge Mitchell. (Id.) He then “requested many times
before and at least once three days after the remittitur was filed that Mr. Walsh timely
file a motion to disqualify the Hon. John T. Mitchell.” (Id.) His counsel at first agreed
but later responded, “Preston, I am too f‐‐‐‐ busy for your case. I do not know if I am
going to withdraw or have it appointed to someone else in our firm.” (Id.) A motion to
disqualify without cause was not filed, but Mr. Walsh did file a belated motion for self‐
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recusal nearly two years later. (Id.) That motion was denied, partly on timeliness
concerns. (Id.)
These factual allegations, verified in Mr. Joy’s amended petition, should have
been presumed to be true for purposes of deciding whether summarily dismissal was
appropriate. Payne, 146 Idaho at 561, 199 P.3d at 136. The lower court instead
erroneously conflated this issue with another claim in which Mr. Joy alleged that he did
not receive a fair and impartial judge (Count VIII). (Tr. Feb. 2, 2017 Hearing, p. 19, ln.
20‐21.) These are different claims with different standards (ineffective assistance of
counsel v. biased judge). Had the district court properly construed the claim, it would
have been required to deny the State’s motion for summary dismissal and allowed the
case to go to an evidentiary hearing.
This so because there was a window of time immediately after the Idaho
Supreme Court’s opinion became final in which Mr. Joy had a renewed right under
Idaho law to disqualify Judge Mitchell without cause. That is, under Idaho Criminal
Rule 25(a)(5), “[a]fter a trial has been held, if a new trial has been ordered by the trial
court or by an appellate court, any party may file a motion for disqualification without
cause of the presiding judge within the time limits set forth in subparagraph (2) of this
Rule.” I.C.R. 25(a)(5). Per subsection (a)(2) of the Rule, the motion must be filed within
seven days of “written notice setting the action for status conference, pre‐trial
conference, trial or for hearing on the first contested motion,” or within fourteen days of
18

written notice of who the presiding judge is, whichever occurs first. I.C.R. 25(a)(2). And
the motion must be filed “before a status conference, a pre‐trial conference, a contested
proceeding or trial in the action.” Id.
There is no doubt that Mr. Joy wanted to avail himself of this right. No notice of a
status conference was issued until a month after the remittitur. See State v. Preston Joy,
Case History for CR‐2009‐0016183, Idaho State Repository, https://goo.gl/SAaRjo. Had
his attorney simply followed through and done what he told Mr. Joy he would do,
Judge Mitchell would have had no choice but to reassign the case.
These factual allegations meet the Strickland two‐part standard for ineffective
assistance of counsel. First, it was objectively unreasonable for Mr. Walsh not to file
motion. The Idaho Supreme Court had just concluded in a published opinion that Judge
Mitchell had made numerous errors in Mr. Joy’s trial, described elsewhere in this brief.
It is understandable that Mr. Joy would lack confidence that the judge presiding over
his case was going to give him a fair shake at a new trial. But there is no reason to
speculate about Mr. Joy’s wishes, as he instructed Mr. Walsh to disqualify the judge.
Any defense attorney, acting reasonably and in his client’s best interests in these
circumstances, would have filed the Rule 25(a)(5) motion immediately after the
remittitur had issued.
Nor is there evidence that Mr. Walsh made a tactical decision not to do so. To the
contrary, Mr. Joy alleged in his verified petition that Mr. Walsh agreed that he would
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file the motion and just simply got too busy. Being too busy is not a tactic. Further
removing this case from any tactical concerns is that Mr. Walsh did, in fact, later file a
motion for disqualification. If he was willing to do that, it makes little sense to say that
he might have made a tactical decision not to file a motion in which he would need to
make no allegations of bias against the judge. When analyzing a failure of trial counsel
to make a motion that is neither strategic nor tactical, the Court examines the
probability of success of the motion in question. Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 561, 149
P.3d 833, 836 (2006). Here, success was assured.
Because of that, there is at least a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unreasonable error, the outcome would have been different. For Mr. Joy, his right to
automatic disqualification was reinstated upon the Idaho Supreme Court’s issuance of
the remittitur and extended to seven days after the first notice of a status conference
was sent. Had counsel filed the motion in that period of time, the motion would have
successfully changed the presiding judge in the case. That is the relevant “outcome” for
purposes of this claim.
The State should not be heard to argue that Mr. Joy failed to allege a reasonable
probability that the outcome of the second trial would have been different had Judge
Mitchell been disqualified. Such an argument focuses on the incorrect “outcome,” and
would set an impossible standard that could never be met.
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To support Mr. Joy’s position, this Court need look no further than Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985). There, the United States Supreme Court held that the
Strickland standard applies to defendants who enter a guilty plea and waive their right
to a trial. Id. at 59. Proving prejudice in that situation, according to the Court, requires a
showing that the defendant would not have pled guilty and instead would have
insisted on going to trial. Id. It is not necessary for him to prove a reasonable probability
that he or she would have been acquitted. Id.
In an analogous context, other jurisdictions have found that in a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s improper waiver of a jury trial, the
prejudice component is satisfied if the petitioner can show that he or she would not
have waived the jury trial. State v. Keller, 760 N.W.2d 451, 453 (Iowa 2009);
Commonwealth v. Mallory, 941 A.2d 686, 704‐05(Penn. 2008). There is no need to show
that had the case gone to a jury trial, there is a probability of an acquittal. Mallory, 941
A.2d at 704‐05.
In these cases, prejudice is measured by assessing the effect that the error had on
the outcome of the stage at issue. In Hill, it was the guilty plea stage. In Keller and
Mallory, it was a stage in which the defendant had to decide whether to have a jury or a
bench trial. Here, the stage was the selection of the presiding judge. Mr. Joy had a
temporary right granted to him by Idaho law to, in effect, choose his presiding judge or,
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at the very least, he had a right to choose who would not be his judge. He was
prejudiced at that stage of the criminal matter by his counsel forfeiture of that right.
Mr. Joy alleged facts that, if true, would entitle him to relief on this claim. The
district court’s judgment as to Count VI should be reversed.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Joy respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s judgment
and remand for further proceedings in front of a different assigned judge.
Respectfully submitted on this 3rd day of November 2017.

Craig Durham
Attorney for Petitioner
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